Industrial emissions in the UK have fallen by roughly half since 1990, when they were 162 MtCO₂e, as a result of a combination of efficiency improvements and sectoral decline.17 Industrial process emissions have fallen more steeply than those from fuel combustion. In 2019, process emissions were 28 MtCO₂e, roughly a third of total industry GHG emissions compared to over 40% in 1990. With only limited process emissions remaining, generally the more challenging emissions to mitigate, the UK is well placed to achieve deep industry-wide cuts by decarbonising the sector’s energy demand.
Illustrative 1.5°C pathways outline an almost doubling of the electrification rate of UK industry from its current level of 37% to between 68-70% by 2050. This corresponds with a reduction in direct CO₂ emissions of at least 33% below 2019 levels, meaning that the UK’s recently released industry sector GHG emissions reduction target of at least two thirds below 2018 levels by 2035 falls within this 1.5°C compatible range.22 This is also the case for the government’s 2050 target; a 90% reduction below 2018 levels.
The UK’s Industrial Decarbonisation Strategy, released in 2021, relies heavily on a utilisation of carbon capture and storage (CCS).22 This increases the risk that its emission reduction targets will not be met, as this technology is yet to be proven as commercially viable. Similarly, a targeted wholesale scaling up of hydrogen production and utilisation includes ‘blue’ hydrogen produced from natural gas with CCS to capture the resulting emissions.23 This has been criticised as unnecessary given the potential for renewable hydrogen production, with the chair of the UK’s hydrogen industry association resigning after it was revealed blue hydrogen was to be included in the UK’s hydrogen strategy.24
The greenhouse gas footprint of blue hydrogen has been shown to be more carbon intensive than burning gas or coal for heating, while over the mid- to long-term, blue hydrogen is likely to be more expensive than hydrogen produced using renewables.25,26 Investments in blue hydrogen production like those proposed by the UK government, will lock in carbon intensive infrastructure, while crowding out investment in renewable hydrogen and slowing down its cost reduction.
1 UK Government. UK becomes first major economy to pass net zero emissions law. (2019).
2 UK Government. 2018 UK greenhouse gas emissions: final figures – data tables. (2020).
3 UK Government. Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2020: Electricity. (2020).
4 UK Government. 2018 UK greenhouse gas emissions: final figures – data tables. (2020).
5 UK Government. Updated Energy and Emissions Projections 2019: Annex J Total Electricity Generation by Source. (2020).
6 UK Government. Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2020: Main Chapters and Annexes A to D dataset. (2020).
7 UK Government. Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2013: Annex I (Energy Balance: Net Calorific Values). (2020).
8 UK Government. Updated Energy and Emissions Projections 2019: Annex A Greenhouse gas emissions by source. (2020).
9 UK Government. Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2020: Main Chapters and Annexes A to D dataset. (2020).
10 UK Government. Digest of UK Energy Statistics 2013: Annex I (Energy Balance: Net Calorific Values). (2020).
11 UK Government. UK becomes first major economy to pass net zero emissions law. (2019).
12 UK Committee on Climate Change. Letter: International aviation and shipping and net zero. (2019).
29 While global cost-effective pathways assessed by the IPCC Special Report 1.5°C provide useful guidance for an upper-limit of emissions trajectories for developed countries, they underestimate the feasible space for such countries to reach net zero earlier. The current generation of models tend to depend strongly on land-use sinks outside of currently developed countries and include fossil fuel use well beyond the time at which these could be phased out, compared to what is understood from bottom-up approaches. The scientific teams which provide these global pathways constantly improve the technologies represented in their models – and novel CDR technologies are now being included in new studies focused on deep mitigation scenarios meeting the Paris Agreement. A wide assessment database of these new scenarios is not yet available; thus, we rely on available scenarios which focus particularly on BECCS as a net-negative emission technology. Accordingly, we do not yet consider land-sector emissions (LULUCF) and other CDR approaches which developed countries will need to implement in order to counterbalance their remaining emissions and reach net zero GHG are not considered here due to data availability.
30 In analysed global-least cost pathways assessed by the IPCC Special Report 1.5°C, the energy sector assumes already a certain amount of carbon dioxide removal technologies, in this case bioenergy carbon capture and storage (BECCS).
The United Kingdomʼs energy mix in the industry sector
petajoule per year
Scaling
SSP1 Low CDR reliance
SSP1 High CDR reliance
20192030204020501 0001 500
Low energy demand
20192030204020501 0001 500
High energy demand - Low CDR reliance
20192030204020501 0001 500
Natural gas
Coal
Oil and e-fuels
Biomass
Biogas
Biofuel
Electricity
Heat
Hydrogen
The United Kingdomʼs industry sector direct CO₂ emissions (of energy demand)
MtCO₂/yr
Unit
02040608010019902010203020502070
Historical emissions
High energy demand - Low CDR reliance
SSP1 Low CDR reliance
SSP1 High CDR reliance
Low energy demand
The United Kingdomʼs GHG emissions from industrial processes
MtCO₂e/yr
020406019902010203020502070
SSP1 Low CDR reliance
SSP1 High CDR reliance
Low energy demand
High energy demand - Low CDR reliance
Historical emissions
1.5°C compatible industry sector benchmarks
Direct CO₂ emissions, direct electrification rates, and combined shares of electricity, hydrogen and biomass from illustrative 1.5°C pathways for The United Kingdom