China’s building sector (residential and commercial) accounted for around 21% of total energy consumption in 2019. Electricity and heat production in China is very coal-intensive, so that indirect energy use in the buildings sector contributed about 15% of the country’s total emissions in 2020.35 CO₂ emissions of direct energy use in the sector stood at 454 MtCO₂ in 2019. These emissions declined by 14% since peaking in 2017. In general, however, there has been an upward trend since 2000, so that 2019 emissions were 66% above 2000 levels.
China’s updated NDC asserts that it will “implement green and low-carbon requirements in all aspects of urban and rural planning and construction management” including the application of “green building standards” to all new urban buildings by 2025.1 These statements are reiterated in the country’s LTS, which provides further targets for the sector. These include achieving a rate of 8% for fossil fuel replacement by renewables by 2025 and 50% rooftop PV coverage for new public buildings and factories by that year.25
Achieving 1.5°C compatibility would require energy-related emissions in China’s building sector to reach zero between 2033 and 2035. This would in turn necessitate increased energy efficiency and electrification in the sector. Electricity’s share of energy consumption would need to reach 69-72% by 2030. Maximising emissions reductions due to greater electrification of the sector would be predicated on increasing renewables penetration as detailed above.
23 World Resources Institute. Accelerating the Net-Zero Transition: Strategic Action for China’s 14th Five-Year Plan. 2020. doi:https://doi.org/10.46830/wrirpt.20.00018.
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34 Yu, Y. China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for Power Industries (2): No Plans for Wind, Solar & Hydro? Energy Iceberg. 2020.
38 China Dialogue. National carbon market expansion may be delayed to 2023. China Dialogue. 2022.
39 The assessment of GDP carbon intensity follows from that conducted in previous analysis but here we have updated data on historical carbon emissions (using the PRIMAP 2021 database), GDP (using Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2021), and GDP growth projections (from World Bank). The GDP growth rate from 2025-2030 is assumed to be 5% p.a.
40 If only covering CO₂, the target would lead to around 2050 MtCO₂e p.a. in 2060 (excluding LULUCF) or emissions reductions of around 75% below 2005 levels. If the target were to cover all GHG emissions, 2060 emissions would be around 600 MtCO₂e p.a. (excluding LULUCF), or around 92% below 2005 levels.3 The 0.1°C of additional warming by 2100 would be a result of the difference in cumulative emissions between an emissions pathway which follow a carbon neutrality target (leading to greater cumulative emissions) versus a GHG neutrality target (leading to less cumulative emissions).
41 Includes electricity and hydrogen. For it to be zero emissions, it would need to be produced out of renewable energies only.