Current Situation

Emissions profile

Algeria's 2022 emissions were 248 MtCO₂e (excluding LULUCF),with the energy sector accounting for 80% of these emissions.¹ The power, transport, and fossil fuel industry sectors each contribute approximately 20% of national emissions, reflecting Algeria's position as a significant oil and gas producer.²

Algeria's GHG emissions rose 12% from 2015 to 2022 (excluding LULUCF). This growth is primarily driven by increased energy consumption in power generation and transportation, alongside expanding fossil fuel exploitation. CO₂ accounts for 73% of emissions, while methane – largely associated with Algeria’s fossil gas operations – represents 23%.³ Algeria’s production of oil and gas is among the most emissions-intensive in the world, explaining why fugitive emissions (included here under fossil fuel industry emissions) account for such a large share of Algeria’s emissions profile.⁴^,⁵^,⁶

Algeria’s NDC targets a 7% emissions reduction by 2030 compared to a business-as-usual scenario. The NDC targets a 7% emissions reduction by 2030 compared to a business-as-usual scenario.⁷

Despite relatively modest per capita emissions compared to global averages, Algeria faces challenges in decoupling economic growth from emissions increases. The industrial sector (including energy use and industrial processes) contributes about 16% to national emissions, while agriculture accounts for 8%.⁸

When graphs include LULUCF, the center value includes LULUCF if the sector is a net source of emissions and excludes it when the sector is a net sink of emissions

Graph description

Historical emissions per gas and per sector. Emissions data is presented in global warming potential (GWP) values from the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).

Data References
- UNFCCC National Inventory Submissions 2024

Energy overview and main policy gaps

In 2022, Algeria’s primary energy mix was dominated (99.9%) by fossil fuels which effectively supplied all of the country’s energy. Of that mix, fossil gas comprised 65%, and oil 35%. A tiny fraction (0.1%) was met by wind, solar and hydro.⁹

Fossil fuel production is integral to Algeria’s economy, with the hydrocarbon sector representing 14% of GDP and 83% of product exports between 2019 and 2023.¹⁰ The Algerian government continues to expand fossil gas production for its own use and to position itself as a major supplier to Europe, particularly as Europe weans itself off Russian gas.¹¹^,¹² Given the European Commission’s ambition to accelerate the shift away from fossil fuels, Algeria risks not only becoming fiscally dependent on a dwindling income stream but also saddling itself with stranded gas infrastructure assets in the medium and long term.¹³

Algeria has abundant wind and solar potential; 80% of Algeria’s landmass is desert with high levels of solar irradiance, and the country has a 1300 kilometre coastline which could be harnessed for wind energy.¹⁴ In 2011, as part of the National Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme (PNEE), the government announced a target of adding 22 GW of renewable capacity by 2030 of (13.5 GW from solar).¹⁵ However, by 2023, only590 MW renewable energy capacity.¹⁶

In 2024, government officials stated they would aim for 16 GW of renewable capacity by 2035 (15 GW on the public electricity distribution network and 1 GW off-grid)¹⁷ and energy efficiency improvements in buildings and industry^.¹⁸ Continued expansion of fossil fuel infrastructure , however, remains a significant barrier to emissions reduction.

Targets and commitments

NDC targets

Unconditional target in 2015 NDC:

As expressed by the country:

Reduce GHG emissions by 7% compared to business-as-usual scenario by 2030. ¹⁹

When excluding LULUCF, Algeria’s target translates to:

18-82% above 2015 levels by 2030, or 245-377 MtCO₂e (AR5)²⁰

Conditional target in 2015 NDC:

As expressed by the country:

Reduce GHG emissions by 22% compared to business-as-usual scenario by 2030:²¹

When excluding LULUCF, Algeria’s target translates to:

1% below to 82% above 2015 levels by 2030, or 205-377 MtCO₂e (AR5)²²

Long-term target

As formulated by the country:

Algeria does not have a net zero GHG emissions target, nor has it submitted a long-term strategy to the UNFCCC

Johannes Gütschow, Daniel Busch, and Mika Pflüger, “The PRIMAP-Hist National Historical Emissions Time Series (1750-2023) v2.6” (Zenodo, September 13, 2024) ↩
OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2023) ↩
Gütschow, Busch, and Pflüger, “The PRIMAP-Hist National Historical Emissions Time Series (1750-2023) v2.6.” ↩
Mohammad S. Masnadi et al., “Global Carbon Intensity of Crude Oil Production,” Science 361, no. 6405 (August 31, 2018): 851–53 ↩
IEA Global Methane Tracker 2023, “Oil and Gas Methane Emissions and Methane Intensity of Production in Selected Countries, 2022” ↩
Fugitive emissions of methane are associated with the extraction & distribution of fossil gas. ↩
République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, “Contribution Prévue Déterminée Au Niveau National CPDN – ALGERIE” (République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2015). ↩
UNFCCC National Inventory Report for Algeria (2022) ↩
IEA, “Algeria - Countries & Regions,” IEA, 2023 ↩
World Bank, “The World Bank in Algeria,” Text/HTML, World Bank, 2023, . https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/algeria/overview ↩
AfricaNews, “Algeria Is in the Spotlight as Leaders of Gas Producing Countries Convene for Summit,” AfricaNews, February 29, 2024 ↩
Approximately half of the fossil gas produced in Algeria was consumed domestically in 2023 - ↩
European Commission, “2040 Climate Target,” European Commission, 2024, ; European Commission, “EU Negotiators Secure Agreement at COP28 to Accelerate the Global Transition Away from Fossil Fuels and Triple Renewables and Double Energy Efficiency This Decade,” Text, European Commission, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6591 ↩
International Trade Administration, “Algeria - Country Commercial Guide” (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2023) ↩
Mohan Gupta, “Unleashing Solar Potential: Insights Into Algeria’s Solar Market Outlook For 2023,” SolarQuarter, July 7, 2023 ↩
IRENA. ‘Renewable Energy Statistics 2024’, 2024 ↩
Algérie Presse Service, “Le Gouvernement s’inscrit ‘Pleinement’ Dans La Stratégie de La Transition Énergétique à l’horizon 2035,” Algérie Presse Service, 2024 ↩
Boukhatem, I., Oei, PY. Fossil gas lock-in risks: analysis of Algeria’s electricity sector and implications for a renewable energy transition. SNF 31, 25–40 (2023) ↩
République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, “Contribution Prévue Déterminée Au Niveau National CPDN – ALGERIE.” ↩
Ibid. ↩
République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, “Contribution Prévue Déterminée Au Niveau National CPDN – ALGERIE.” ↩
Algeria's INDC submitted in 2016 commits to reducing total emissions including LULUCF by 7-22% below business-as-usual (BAU) by 2030, achieving the minimum end of the range with domestic resources. However, the INDC does not include a BAU scenario for reference. Therefore, we construct two different BAU scenarios to assess the potential emissions level targeted by the INDC. For the first, we use the "REFERENCE" scenario provided in Algeria's National Inventory Document (NID) that projects energy emissions from combustion between 2019 and 2030, which accounted for about one-third of emissions in 2019. For remaining emissions excluding LULUCF, we projected emissions to 2030 using the average growth of emissions from 2010-2019. For the second BAU scenario, we used the RCP4.5 SSP2 scenario. Both BAU scenarios were harmonised to 2019 historical emissions from the NID, while LULUCF emissions were assumed to remain constant at the average level from 2010-2019. ↩

What is Algeria's pathway to limit global warming to 1.5°C?

Emissions profile

Algeria's 2022 GHG emissions

excluding LULUCF MtCO₂e/yr

Energy overview and main policy gaps

Targets and commitments

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