What is United States's pathway to limit global warming to 1.5°C?

Ambition Gap

Raising ambition

As the United States has once again submitted written notice to exit the Paris Agreement under the Trump administration, as early as January 2026 the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) process will no longer be binding for the US. In addition, the US will no longer be subject to the climate finance obligations set in the Paris Agreement.

The US’ action makes closing the ambition gap significantly more challenging and will likely require deeper and faster reductions elsewhere globally in order to align with 1.5°C.

The previous administration had submitted an NDC reiterating its 2030 emissions target of 50-52% below 2005 levels by 2030 and committing to a new target of 61-66% below 2005 levels by 2035 (both including LULUCF). For comparability to our pathways, we assess these targets as 44-48% below 2005 levels in 2030 excl. LULUCF and 54-61% below 2005 levels in 2035 excluding LULUCF.

These targets are not aligned with 1.5°C compatible pathways.

To be 1.5°C compatible, the US would need to increase the ambition of its 2030 target to at least 58% below 2005 levels by 2030 (excl. LULUCF). A 1.5°C compatible 2035 target for the US must be at least 71% below 2005 levels excl. LULUCF.

When including LULUCF, the US’ total emissions under 1.5°C compatible pathways would fall to 82% below 2005 levels by 2035. To be 1.5°C compatible when including the LULUCF sector, both the US’ 2030 and 2035 targets would need to be strengthened significantly. For more information on our indicative 1.5°C LULUCF pathways, please see our methodology page.

United States' total GHG emissions MtCO₂e/yr

Displayed values

Reference Year

Target Year

LULUCF

*These pathways reflect the level of mitigation ambition needed domestically to align the country with a cost-effective breakdown of the global emissions reductions in 1.5ºC compatible pathways. For developing countries, achieving these reductions may well rely on receiving significant levels of international support. In order to achieve their 'fair share' of climate action, developed countries would also need to support emissions reductions in developing countries.

  • Graph description

    The figure shows national 1.5°C compatible emissions pathways. This is presented through a set of illustrative pathways and a 1.5°C compatible range for total GHG emissions excl. LULUCF. Emissions data is presented in global warming potential (GWP) values from the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). The 1.5°C compatible range is based on global cost-effective pathways assessed by the IPCC AR6, defined by the 5th-50th percentiles of the distributions of such pathways which achieve the LTTG of the Paris Agreement. We consider one primary net-negative emission technology in our analysis (BECCS) due to data availability. Net negative emissions from the land-sector (LULUCF) and novel CDR technologies are not included in this analysis due to data limitations from the assessed models. Furthermore, in the global cost-effective model pathways we analyse, such negative emissions sources are usually underestimated in developed country regions, with current-generation models relying on land sinks in developing countries.

    Methodology (excluding LULUCF)

    Data References (excluding LULUCF)

Long term pathway

Under the former Biden administration, the US submitted its long-term strategy (LTS) in 2021 with the target of reaching net zero emissions by 2050.1 Under the second Trump administration and ensuing exit from the Paris Agreement, this target and LTS was abandoned. As with its NDC targets, abandoning the net zero target makes closing the ambition gap significantly more challenging and will likely require deeper and faster reductions elsewhere globally in order to align with 1.5°C.

Under the former Biden administration, the net zero target was assessed as a range due to uncertainty around how reliant the US would be on land use sinks as indicated in the LTS, equivalent to 80–93% emissions reductions below 2005 levels (excl. LULUCF).2

Under the Trump administration, significant policy rollbacks will likely make it more challenging for the US to achieve net zero GHG emissions by 2050. Any slowdown in emissions reductions that occurs during the second Trump administration will require further reductions over a shorter amount of time in the future, further adding to the existing cost of delay.

United States' total CO₂ emissions excl. LULUCF MtCO₂/yr

1.5°C compatible emissions benchmarks

Key emissions benchmarks of Paris compatible Pathways for United States. The 1.5°C compatible range is based on the Paris Agreement compatible pathways from the IPCC AR6 filtered with sustainability criteria. The median (50th percentile) to 5th percentile and middle of the range are provided here. Relative reductions are provided based on the reference year.

Reference Year

LULUCF

Indicator
2005
Reference year
2023
2030
2035
2040
2050
Total GHG
Megatonnes CO₂ equivalent per year
7495
6149
2682 to 3150
1629 to 2202
812 to 1398
60 to 621
Relative to reference year in %
-64 to -58%
-78 to -71%
-89 to -81%
-99 to -92%
Total CO₂
MtCO₂/yr
5784
4613
1898 to 2268
808 to 1479
174 to 801
-647 to -32
Relative to reference year in %
-67 to -61%
-86 to -74%
-97 to -86%
-111 to -101%
Total GHG
Megatonnes CO₂ equivalent per year
6587
1513 to 2191
703 to 1201
-55 to 614
-517 to 33
Relative to reference year in %
-77 to -67%
-89 to -82%
-101 to -91%
-108 to -99%
Total CO₂
MtCO₂/yr
4877
-1169 to -959
-926 to -1001
-867 to -784
-578 to -589
Relative to reference year in %
-124 to -120%
-119 to -121%
-118 to -116%
-112 to -112%

All information excluding LULUCF emissions and novel CDR approaches. BECCS are the only carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies considered in these benchmarks
All values are rounded. Emissions data is presented in global warming potential (GWP) values from the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).

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