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Current situation

What is Japanʼs pathway to limit global warming to 1.5°C?

Emissions profile

As of 2017, Japan’s GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF) amount to around 1290 MtCO₂e/yr and stem primarily from fuel combustion in the energy sector (88%). Within energy, CO₂ emissions from power production account for 40% of the total, while that from industry, transport, and buildings account for 21%, 16%, and 11% respectively. Much smaller GHG shares come from agriculture (2.6%, mostly CH₄) and industrial processes (7.7%). Japan’s land use and forestry sector currently contributes a small carbon sink of -59 MtCO₂e/yr.

Japan’s emissions were stagnant for decades, with little change in energy demand and emissions intensity, but started decreasing from 2013 by an average 2.5% per year.3 Japan’s per capita emissions have likewise decreased since 2013, reaching 9.3 tCO₂e/cap in 2018, which is slightly above the EU average and about half the US average.4

Emissions from most sectors have been slowly decreasing, most notably in industry. However, those from the power sector grew by around a third over the last three decades. This was primarily due to an increase in coal power production following the 2011 Fukushima accident. However, emissions from power have also started decreasing since 2013, a trend buoyed by a burgeoning renewables sector and helped by the gradual re-introduction of nuclear power. Current policy projections suggest that the country’s GHG emissions (excluding LULUCF) will decrease by 25-35% from 2013 levels by 2030 to between 910-1060 MtCO₂e/yr.3

1 Climate Action Tracker. 1.5°C-consistent benchmarks for enhancing Japan’s 2030 climate target. (2021).

2 The Government of Japan. The Long-term Strategy under the Paris Agreement. (2021).

3 Climate Action Tracker. Japan. CAT September 2021 Update. (2021).

4 Climate Transparency. Japan – Climate Transparency Report 2021. (2021).

5 IEA. Gas 2020. (2020).

6 World Bank. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2021. (2021) doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1728-1.

7 Climate Analytics & Renewable Energy Institute. Science Based Coal Phase – Out Timeline for Japan Implications for Policymakers and Investors. (2018).

8 METI. Consideration of the phase-out of inefficient coal and the revision of rules on the use of power transmission lines to enable renewables becoming main power sources. In Japanese. (2020).

9 The Japan Times. METI minister signals a major shift for Japan away from coal and toward renewables. July 3, 2020. (2020).

10 Gray, M., Takamura, Y. & Morisawa, M. Land of the Rising Sun and Offshore Wind. (2019).

11 Arima, J. Reclaiming pragmatism in Japan’s energy policy. East Asia Forum (2021).

12 Deng, Y. Y. et al. Quantifying a realistic, worldwide wind and solar electricity supply. (2015).

13 IEA. World Energy Balances 2019. (2021).

14 Climate Action Tracker. Data & Trends. (2017).

15 The Government of Japan. Green Growth Strategy Through Achieving Carbon Neutrality in 2050. (2020).

16 IEA. Japan 2021 – Energy Policy Review. Int. Energy Agency (2021).

17 Climate Action Tracker. Japan. CAT September 2020 Update.(2020).

18 Government of Japan. Japan’s Nationally Determined Contribution. (2021).

19 METI. Outline of Strategic Energy Plan (6th Strategic Energy Plan). (2021).

20 NHK. Zenbun: Suga shushou shisei hoshin enzetsu [Full text: Prime Minister Suga’s policy speech]. (2021).

21 Schreyer, F. et al. Common but differentiated leadership: strategies and challenges for carbon neutrality by 2050 across industrialized economies. Environ. Res. Lett. 15, 114016 (2020).

22 Shiraki, H., Sugiyama, M., Matsuo, Y., Komiyama, R. & Fujimori, S. The role of renewables in the Japanese power sector : implications from the EMF35 JMIP. Sustain. Sci. (2021) doi:10.1007/s11625-021-00917-y.

23 IEA. Offshore Wind Outlook 2019.(2019).

24 Statistics Bureau of Japan. Statistical Handbook Japan 2021. (2021).

25 IEA. Global EV Outlook 2021. (2021).

26 Kuriyama, A., Tamura, K. & Kuramochi, T. Can Japan enhance its 2030 greenhouse gas emission reduction targets?–Assessment of economic and energy-related assumptions in Japan’s NDC. Energy Policy 328–340 (2019).

27 U.S. Energy Information Administration. Country Analysis Executive Summary: Japan. (2020).

28 Kojima, S. & Asakawa, K. Expectations for Carbon Pricing in Japan in the Global Climate Policy Context. in Carbon Pricing in Japan (eds. Arimura, T. H. & Matsumoto, S.) (Springer, 2021). doi:

29 METI. Japan’s 5th Strategic Energy Plan (provisional translation). (2018).

30 Esteban, M., Zhang, Q. & Utama, A. Estimation of the energy storage requirement of a future 100% renewable energy system in Japan. Energy Policy 47, 22–31 (2012).

31 Esteban, M. et al. 100% renewable energy system in Japan: Smoothening and ancillary services. Appl. Energy 224, 698–707 (2018).

32 Cheng, C., Blakers, A., Stocks, M. & Lu, B. 100% renewable energy in Japan. Energy Convers. Manag. 255, 115299 (2022).

33 Kimura, O. Japanese Top Runner Approach for energy efficiency standards. (2010)..

34 Inoue, N. & Matsumoto, S. An examination of losses in energy savings after the Japanese Top Runner Program. Energy Policy 124, 312–319 (2019).

35 IEA. Act on the rational use of energy (Energy Efficiency Act). (2017).

36 METI. 2019 – Understanding the current energy situation in Japan (Part 1). (2019).

37 In order to guarantee that the derived emissions still achieve the global temperature goal when aggregated together across all assessed countries we assess the distribution of pathways from the median until the 5th percentile to form the higher and lower bound of the 1.5°C compatible range (60-72% below 2013 levels). Emission values are rounded to integers. In the Climate Action Tracker a slightly different methodological choice is used to define a 1.5°C compatible benchmark, where projections are harmonised on a different historical year and the median of the range of 1.5° compatible pathways is used – 62% reduction from 2013 levels by 2030.

38 While Japan’s emissions intensity and energy intensity of GDP have decreased significantly over the last three decades, this has been due to energy efficiency improvements rather than a reduction in fossil fuel share in TPES.26 Indeed, coal’s share in primary energy grew by over 50% since 1990. Please see the Climate Action Tracker’s Data Portal for further details.

39 The transport and industrial sectors accounted for 38% and 24%, respectively, of oil consumption in 2018. Use in the power sector has declined significantly since 2013.27

40 The 2-3 USD/tCO₂ value refers to Japan’s carbon tax. The country also levies a fuel excise tax and has two regional emissions trading systems, in Japan and Saitama The current ETS prices are around 5 USD/tCO₂.6 Accounting for all carbon pricing instruments, the average effective rate has been estimated to be around 39 USD/tCO₂.28

41 According to Japan Beyond Coal, as of January 2022 japan has 51 GW of coal-fired power plants in operation (0.6 GW mothballed) and another 6 GW of capacity under development (the majority of this under construction with a small amount in planning phase).

42 Note that Japan’s recent Green Growth Strategy also has nuclear playing a significant role in a future decarbonised power sector.15

43 Note that the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry provides 2030 projections for both total primary energy supply and final energy consumption (350 million kilolitres).

44 Fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS) are a significant component of TPES in some 1.5°C compatible pathways, particularly after 2030. The median of these pathways has fossil fuels with CCS accounting for 29% of TPES in 2050, greater than the 17% share for unabated fossil fuels.

45 The low energy demand 1.5°C compatible pathway has TPES in 2050 at around 5 EJ. Japan’s energy consumption has been decreasing fairly steadily since reaching a peak in 2005 and recent reporting had projected a further decline in the coming years, both due to demographic changes and efficiency improvements.27,29 Projections from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry have TPES decreasing from 509 million kilolitres of oil equivalent (kl) in 2018 to 489 million kl by 2030.

46 This would translate to a compound annual rate of reduction between 7-10% compared to the rate of reduction of 2.5% seen between 2013 and 2019.

47 The upper value in the range implies negative emissions which could result from the use of carbon dioxide removal technologies such as BECCS. At the 25th percentile, the 1.5°C compatible pathways show that around 44 MtCO₂e/yr of GHG emissions would need to be balanced out by 2050. Although the long-term strategy does not give an exact value for the anticipated level of removals from forest carbon sinks and other carbon dioxide removal technologies in 2050, the document does provide an estimate of net carbon removals in 2019 (45.9 MtCO₂).2 This seems to be in line with the projected 2030 GHG removals stated in the updated NDC (47.7 MtCO₂).18

48 Values are for 2019. Renewables include wind, solar, geothermal, hydro, and biofuels.

49 The government has stated that it will pursue nuclear power options as part of their Green Growth Strategy. Specifically, it will support efforts to develop small module reactors, hydrogen production by high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, and fusion energy. The government aims to commercialise the former two technologies by 2030.15

50 Please see the International Energy Agency’s Japan webpage for details.

51 Some pathways assume much lower renewables shares (as low as a third in 2050) instead relying on fossil and bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, starting in the 2020s and reaching as much as 65% of the power sector by 2060. Given the significant costs and lead times required for CCS, it is unclear how such fast deployment could be achieved. The same pathways also all assume a return to nuclear power, reaching shares of 30% and absolute values well above pre-Fukushima levels

52 Other recent studies have also modelled viable pathways to a 100% renewable power sector for Japan and explored the implications for storage, ancillary services, and price.3032

53 Regression analysis of changes in emissions on changes in the use of various energy sources (liquid fuels, gaseous fuels, electricity) over the period 1990 – 2019 shows that changes in emissions were most highly correlated with changes in liquid fuels (oil) consumption. Changes in emissions were also correlated, albeit less so, with changes in gaseous fuels (natural gas) use. For both of these fuels, the correlation with emissions was found to be positive.

54 Efficiency standards for several electrical home appliances were introduced in 1999 while further standards, including for gas stoves and heaters, were introduced in 2002. These standards were set so that full enactment would occur 4 to 6 years after introduction. Thus, for most household appliances, full enactment of energy efficiency standards took place between 2003 and 2010.33 A recent study has shown that the top runner programme has led to a rebound effect whereby greater household consumption negates the energy efficiency gains.34 This effect is consistent with the rising consumption of electricity in the building sector and may explain the levelling out of emissions intensity levels from 2010 onwards.

55 In 2018, Japan’s industrial sector consumed 116 Mtoe including non-energy use (34 Mtoe). Oil accounted for 43% of the total, with coal and natural gas making up 18% and 10% respectively. Electricity accounted for 25% of consumption and biofuels 3%. The majority of industrial fuel consumption was due to the chemical and petrochemical industries (43% in 2018).16 With regards to GDP, here we use the term secondary industry to refer to mining, manufacturing, and construction, as per the Statistical Handbook of Japan.24 Value is current as of 2019. See table 3.3 therein.

56 Japan’s push for energy efficiency improvements began as a response to the two oil crises of the 1970s, as exemplified by the Energy Efficiency Act enacted in 1979. The Act has been updated with major revisions since then, such as the introduction of the aforementioned Top Runner Program in 1998. The latest revision to the Act occurred in 2018.35

57 The consumption of electricity decreased after by around 20% between 2006 and 2008 due to the Global Financial Crisis and has yet to recover.

58 This average reduction takes into account the significant declines which occurred during the Asian (1997) and Global (2007-08) Financial Crises.

59 The buildings and industry sectors have a greater overall energy demand and thus a greater absolute reliance on imported fossil fuels. This takes into account both direct fuel use and electricity consumption (indirect use). Note that in 2018, Japan’s import dependency for crude oil, LNG, and coal was 99.7%, 97.5%, and 99.3% respectively.36

60 The 5th Strategic Energy Plan put forth a goal of a 50.3 million kilolitre (42.8 Mtoe) reduction in energy demand by 2030. This would be achieved through reductions in the industry, transport, commercial, and residential sectors of 10.42, 16.07, 12.26, and 11.6 million kilolitres respectively.16

61 The other two countries, China and the UK, aim to meet their targets by 2035 and 2030 respectively.

Japanʼs current GHG emissions


Displayed values

By sector

  • Power
  • Industry (energy use)
  • Transport
  • Buildings
  • Fugitive emissions
  • Other
  • Industry (processes)
  • Agriculture
  • Waste
Energy (88%)⟵ LULUCF negative emissions

By gas

  • CO₂
  • Other
  • CH₄
  • N₂O

Sectors by gas

Industry (processes)

Energy system

Japan’s economy is highly dependent on fossil fuels which accounted for around 90% of Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) in 2019 (renewables accounted for 6.4% of the total in that year).38 The largest contribution to TPES, around 39%, is oil, primarily used in transport and industry.39 Coal and natural gas contribute 28% and 22% to TPES respectively. The supply of the latter is almost entirely imported, making Japan the world’s largest importer of LNG. Imports are likely to decrease in the coming years mainly due to nuclear restart and a greater uptake of renewables.5

In the power sector, coal has steadily expanded, driven by the country’s recent liberalisation of the power market, without effective policies in place to reflect the external cost of fossil fuels: Japan’s carbon price is set at 2-3 USD/tCO₂ making it difficult for low carbon sources to compete.6,7,40 Although the government has announced plans to phase out inefficient coal plants, its energy strategy still sees coal providing a quarter of the country’s power a decade from now.8,9 Given the government’s emissions reductions targets, existing and planned coal-fired power plants face stranded asset risk.7,10,41

Nuclear energy historically provided about 15% of the country’s TPES, but all plants were suspended after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. Although these plants are slowly being brought back online, it is unclear whether the government’s NDC target of 20-22% will be achievable given more stringent safety standards now in place.11,42

Renewables have started to make inroads into Japan’s electricity sector, primarily spurred by support for solar PV, one of the biggest potential renewable sources in Japan.12 Of the total renewable share of around 19% in 2019, hydropower and solar PV accounted for about a third each, followed by biomass.13 Its NDC target of 36-38% renewable share is set to be (over) achieved without additional effort and recent regulatory improvements should speed up adoption of solar energy.14

Japan is also formulating a plan to develop its largely untapped offshore wind potential.3,12 Renewable energy accounted for about 6% of TPES in 2019. In their Green Growth Strategy, Japan has indicated that offshore wind and hydrogen fuel will play key roles in decarbonising the country’s power and overall energy sectors.15

Cars are Japan’s largest export products followed by machinery including computers. A recent ministerial report has recommended setting a GHG emissions reduction target for all new vehicles produced by Japanese car manufacturers of 80% by 2050, relative to 2010 levels.3 Given the country’s role in the world’s automotive market, this domestic target could be a key driver of global emissions reduction in the transport sector.16

Japan has no binding targets or emissions reduction policies for the industry sector, but relies on voluntary commitments from business associations. Nevertheless, industrial emissions have seen the largest decreases, dropping by a third in the last three decades, due to a combination of reduced activity and reduced emissions per output.3The strongest reductions have come from the cement sector.17

Targets and commitments

Economy-wide targets

Target type

Base year emissions target

NDC target

  • 46% below 2013 by 2030 (excl. LULUCF in the base year, but including LULUCF credits in the target year).18 Absolute 2030 emissions level of 766 MtCO₂e (incl. LULUCF).
  • 42% below 2013 by 2030 (excl. LULUCF). Absolute 2030 emissions level of 814 MtCO₂e (excl. LULUCF).3

Market mechanism

  • No market mechanism included in NDC target, but NDC leaves open the option of using credits from its overseas crediting system towards NDC achievement.

Long-term target

  • Reduce GHGs to net zero by 2050.2

Sector coverage


Greenhouse gas coverage


Sectoral targets


  • Final energy consumption target used as basis for the NDC: 326 million kilolitre (2.05 billion barrels of oil equivalent).19,43


  • 100% electrified vehicles in new passenger vehicle sales by 2035 the latest.20
  • As part of the overall NDC target, 35% GHG emissions reduction in transport sector from 2013 levels by 2030.18


  • Power generation targets used as basis for the NDC:19
    • Renewables: 36-38% in 2030 (18% in 2019).
    • Nuclear: 20-22% in 2030 (6% in 2019).
    • Coal: 19% in 2030 (32% in 2019).
    • LNG: 20% in 2030 (37% in 2019).
    • Oil: 2% in 2030 (7% in 2019).


  • Aim for new houses and buildings built from 2030 to meet zero energy building/house efficiency standards.19
  • As part of the overall NDC target, 66% GHG emissions reduction in residential sector from 2013 levels by 2030.18