What is Germany's pathway to limit global warming to 1.5°C?
Power

Decarbonising the power sector
In Germany, renewables (including bioenergy) in the power sector are growing and in 2023 made up 54% of the mix, while fossil fuels made up 44%. In the same year, Germany generated almost 498 TWh to power its economy.
Germany's power mix
terawatt-hour per year
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Graph description
Power energy mix composition in generation (TWh) and capacities (GW) for the years 2030, 2035, 2040 through 2070 based on the HPA scenario.
Methodology
Data References
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Under the HPA scenario, fossil fuels could be phased out of the power mix by 2030 driven by strong renewables growth, reaching 90% (predominantly wind and solar). This would result in emissions reductions of 74% in 2030 compared to 2023 levels. Renewables would grow to 94% by 2035 and reach 97% by 2050. Biofuels are gradually phased out from electricity generation, reaching negligible amounts by 2050. By mid-century the grid would be supplied by 46% wind and roughly 50% solar energy. As a result of electrification across end-use sectors, the HPA scenario projects electricity demand will grow by 117% from 500 TWh/yr in 2023 to 1080 TWh/yr in 2050. This demand growth would be smaller with the power sector fully transitioned to more efficient renewables than if it prolongs the use of inefficient fossil fuels.
Germany has set an 80% renewable electricity target by 2030,1 which falls short of the HPA scenario. Coal has not been completely phased out from Germany’s power sector, though it has been declining rapidly. To align with the HPA scenario, Germany needs to phase-out coal by 2030, eight years before Germany’s current phase out target year of 2038.2 In response to the energy crisis caused by the US-Israel war on Iran, Chancellor Merz has signaled the phase-out of coal may be delayed, as they will keep existing coal-fired power stations connected to the grid longer should the energy crisis continue.3
In March 2026, the German Government released its Klimaschutzprogramm outlining 67 measures to limit its dependence on fossil fuels.4 This comes on the cusp of an energy crisis triggered by the US-Isael war on Iran which has increased global fuel prices. The Klimaschutzprogramm plans to add 12 GW of onshore wind capacity by 2030 – a move which is expected to reduce electricity prices by EUR 0.6c.5
There are still no signs that Germany is planning to phase-out fossil gas, rather, Germany is deepening its reliance on it. Based on signed LNG contracts to date, Germany will grow its LNG supply well into 2049, sourced mostly from the US.6 In 2025, the CDU-led government announced Germany will add 20 GW of new gas plant capacity, equipped with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). Under the HPA scenario, CCS equipped to fossil fuels plays a negligible role in the transition. Germany’s current plans will likely only prolong the use (and dependency) of fossil gas in the system while making the cost of the transition higher for the economy and society in the long term.
As of January 2026, Germany has 15GW of new gas power plants in development of the 20GW it committed to building.7 The government also announced that 12 GW of these new powerplants must be hydrogen-capable and designed in a way that a switch later to green hydrogen is possible. 8 This will only prolong the use of fossil gas, especially if the production volumes of green hydrogen won’t be met in the future. Under the HPA scenario, hydrogen has no role in the power sector in Germany. Given the limited supply of green hydrogen production in the pipeline, whatever supply of hydrogen produced from renewables is available will need to be directed to end use sectors such as industry and shipping – as indicated by the scenario.
Germany’s grid infrastructure and market are in need of serious improvements. Both to increase connectivity internally and with other EU countries and to increase the storage capacity to limit or avoid curtailment of excess renewable energy. As wind and solar continue to scale up, the overproduction of renewable electricity has resulted in negative electricity prices because it cannot it be consumed fast enough, as well as the lack of storage capacity and grid bottlenecks.9 Germany curtailed 9.6TWh of electricity, roughly 4% of the energy produced by wind and solar in 2025.10
Germany must disentangle the influence of gas prices dictating final electricity prices even when gas contributes minority shares in the electricity market. Gas is often the last and most expensive source needed to meet demand, acting as a price-setter.11,12 In Germany, the cost of solar and wind have dramatically fallen since 2010. In 2010 the levelized cost of electricity from solar was EUR 392 EUR/ MWh, and onshore wind cost 144 EUR/MWh. In 2024 that fell to 54 EUR/MWh and 43 EUR/MWh, respectively. Meanwhile, when fuel costs for gas spiked in August 2022 to 465 EUR/MWh, so did electricity prices.13
Germany's power sector emissions and carbon intensity
MtCO₂/yr
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Graph description
Emissions and carbon intensity of the power sector in the HPA scenario.
Methodology
Data References
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Investments
Investments in renewables has been increasing over the past years. In 2024, the German government spent EUR 32 bn on renewable installations for electricity generation – slightly lower than the EUR 38 bn spent in 2023 but double compared to 2021.14 These are the highest investments seen in Germany since 2000. The 2022 energy crisis spurred a spike in renewable energy investments in 2023, with half of investments directed towards solar (EUR 17 bn) and 27% towards wind (EUR 9 bn).15
That resulted in 172 GW of installed renewables capacity (wind, solar, hydro and biomass) in 2023. Between 2023 and 2024, 15 GW of solar and 3 GW of wind capacity was added. In 2024, wind and solar capacity totaled 163 GW.16
Germany's renewable electricity investments and capacities
Billion USD / yr
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Graph description
Average annual investments in power sector renewable electricity capacity and cumulative installed power capacities across time based on the HPA scenario.
Methodology
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Under the Highest Possible Ambition (HPA) scenario, Germany’s installed renewable electricity capacity, primarily from wind and solar, would need to increase to 406 GW by 2030 from 172 GW in 2023, and then to 784 GW by 2050. The German government has set targets to reach 215 GW of installed solar capacity and 131 GW of installed wind capacity by 2030. By 2050, these targets increase to 400 GW for solar and 230 GW for wind. Germany’s own projections estimate that renewable capacity will reach 201 GW by 2030, including other renewable technologies, and 640 GW by 2050.17 While current projections suggest that Germany is broadly on track to meet its national targets, a 144 GW gap remains between planned renewable capacity and the level required under the HPA scenario by 2050.
To achieve this increase in renewable capacity following the HPA scenario, investments would need to scale up to USD 28 bn (EUR 27 bn) per year between 2026 and 2030. Most (46%) would be directed to solar) and (44%) to wind capacity. As renewable capacity builds up, annual investments decrease over time. Between 2031 and 2035, annual investments fall to USD 20 bn (EUR 19 bn) and by 2050 investments fall to USD 9 bn (EUR 8.5 bn) annually.
These investment figures focus exclusively on generation capacities (solar and wind) and therefore reflect only part of the overall system transformation. A fully decarbonised power system requires substantial additional investments in grid infrastructure, storage, and system flexibility. Transmission and distribution expansion, battery storage deployment, and system digitalisation are critical to integrate high shares of variable renewable energy and ensure system reliability. These additional investments can significantly increase total system costs but are necessary to enable the transition.
While these investments needs appear substantial, the cost of inaction would be far greater when considering the losses from direct climate impacts that are expected to worsen under current policy projections. For example, in July 2021, floods in Germany resulted in EUR 33 bn in losses; in 2023 labour capacity losses due to extreme heat is estimated to have cost EUR 863 mn; and in agriculture around EUR 184 mn in annual revenue losses were attributed to extreme weather events between 2018 and 2022.18
In 2023, Germany spent EUR 41 bn on fossil fuel subsidies,19 equivalent to 1% of its GDP , which is higher than the 0.7% EU average.20 The government is increasingly allocating money to fossil fuels rather than scaling up adequate finance towards renewables. In March 2026, the German government indicated it will scrap financial support for rooftop solar PV systems, citing the advanced maturity of the market no longer requiring financial support.21 Furthermore, the government plans to spend EUR 3 bn in 2031 on new gas power plants, and spending an additional EUR 2.3 bn annually between 2023 and 2045.22 These investment decisions favouring gas over wind and solar could have resulted a widening investment gap in the power sector needed and making the 1.5°C transition more costly. At the same time, it can limit revenues generation for the country. Already today, renewables are profitable for cities and rural areas, generating around EUR 5.5 bn annually. If Germany’s wind and solar expansion targets are met, renewables could generate EUR 12.4 bn annual from 2033 annually.23
1.5°C compatible power sector benchmarks
Carbon intensity, renewable generation share, and fossil fuel generation share from 1.5°C pathway based on the HPA scenario for Germany
| Indicator |
2023
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2030
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2035
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2040
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2050
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2060
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2070
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Carbon intensity of power
gCO₂/kWh
|
335
|
87
|
48
|
33
|
20
|
12
|
5
|
|
Relative to reference year in %
|
-74%
|
-86%
|
-90%
|
-94%
|
-96%
|
-99%
|
| Indicator |
2023
|
2030
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2035
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2040
|
2050
|
2060
|
2070
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Share of unabated coal
%
|
27
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
Share of unabated gas
%
|
16
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
|
Share of renewable energy
%
|
45
|
90
|
94
|
96
|
97
|
97
|
97
|
The HPA scenario rapidly scales CDR from the 2030s onwards, with engineered removals reaching around 5 GtCO2/yr by 2050, supported by limited removals of around 2 GtCO2/yr from the land-use system. The HPA scenario avoids large-scale nature-based CDR, given the risks of overreliance on natural sinks in a warming world.
All values are rounded
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Methodology
Data References
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