China’s transport sector CO₂ emissions were 901 MtCO₂ in 2019, an increase of 127% since 2005. Motorised road transport (including passenger and freight) accounts for more than 80% of these emissions.35 Transport sector energy consumption stood at 13.5 EJ/yr in 2019, accounting for 15% of the national total in that year. The vast majority, 87%, is met by oil.
China’s NDC highlights the uptake of electric vehicles (EVs), modal shift in passenger and freight transport, and energy efficiency as decarbonisation measures for the transport sector already underway.1 Indeed, China is set to reach its goal of a 20% EV share in new vehicle sales by 2025, possibly even earlier.4 The country’s LTS sets a further target for 40% market share of “new energy and clean energy” vehicles by 2030.
For China, 1.5°C compatibility would require an emissions reduction in the transport sector of 58-61% below 2019 levels by 2030, and reaching zero by 2050. This could result from increasing electrification of the sector as well as the introduction of hydrogen to the fuel mix. Zero emissions fuels could contribute 6-34% by 2030, and 41-99% by 2050, with electrification making up the greatest share.41 Biomass liquids could also play a role, accounting for 7-18% of the fuel mix in 2030 and 29-47% in 2050 in these pathways, although sustainability risks would need to be taken into account.
As the total number of cars in China is likely to further increase in the coming years, efforts to increase EV sales will be critical. Modal shift, from private to public transport for passengers, and from road to rail for freight, will also be required to effectively decarbonise sector.
23 World Resources Institute. Accelerating the Net-Zero Transition: Strategic Action for China’s 14th Five-Year Plan. 2020. doi:https://doi.org/10.46830/wrirpt.20.00018.
28 Yu, Y. Renewable Energy in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan: Five Changes. Energy Iceberg. 2021.
29 Hu, Y. & Cheng, H. The urgency of assessing the greenhouse gas budgets of hydroelectric reservoirs in China. Nat. Clim. Chang.3, 708–712. 2013.
30 Li, S., Zhang, Q., Bush, R. T. & Sullivan, L. A. Methane and CO2 emissions from China’s hydroelectric reservoirs: a new quantitative synthesis. Environ. Sci. Pollut. Res.22, 5325–5339. 2015.
31 Xie, X., Jiang, X., Zhang, T. & Huang, Z. Regional water footprints assessment for hydroelectricity generation in China. Renew. Energy138, 316–325. 2019.
32 Yuefang, D. & Steil, S. China Three Gorges Project resettlement: Policy, planning and implementation. J. Refug. Stud.16, 422–434. 2003.
33 Lewis, C. China’s Great Dam Boom: A Major Assult on Its Rivers. Yale Environment 360. 2013.
34 Yu, Y. China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for Power Industries (2): No Plans for Wind, Solar & Hydro? Energy Iceberg. 2020.
38 China Dialogue. National carbon market expansion may be delayed to 2023. China Dialogue. 2022.
39 The assessment of GDP carbon intensity follows from that conducted in previous analysis but here we have updated data on historical carbon emissions (using the PRIMAP 2021 database), GDP (using Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2021), and GDP growth projections (from World Bank). The GDP growth rate from 2025-2030 is assumed to be 5% p.a.
40 If only covering CO₂, the target would lead to around 2050 MtCO₂e p.a. in 2060 (excluding LULUCF) or emissions reductions of around 75% below 2005 levels. If the target were to cover all GHG emissions, 2060 emissions would be around 600 MtCO₂e p.a. (excluding LULUCF), or around 92% below 2005 levels.3 The 0.1°C of additional warming by 2100 would be a result of the difference in cumulative emissions between an emissions pathway which follow a carbon neutrality target (leading to greater cumulative emissions) versus a GHG neutrality target (leading to less cumulative emissions).
41 Includes electricity and hydrogen. For it to be zero emissions, it would need to be produced out of renewable energies only.