Skip to content

Poland Sectors

What is Polandʼs pathway to limit global warming to 1.5°C?

While Poland’s overall emissions decreased between 1990 and 2019, those from the industrial sector increased by 7% in the same period. Industrial process related emissions accounted for around 6% and industrial energy emissions accounted for 8% of total emissions in 2019 – a smaller share compared to the EU’s average of 9% and 10% respectively.

Electrification of the sector will be the main driver of emissions reductions from energy consumption which currently constitutes around 60% of all emissions from this sector. According to 1.5°C compatible scenarios, the share of electricity in energy consumption could increase from 29% in 2019 to between 43-47% in 2030 and up to 67% in 2050.

The remaining 40% of process related emissions show a significant decrease in the late 2020s, and especially in the 2030s, resulting in full decarbonisation by the end of that decade. The scenarios differ in terms of technologies used for decarbonisation some showing increasing share of electricity and hydrogen as the main drivers of emissions cuts.

The main policy for reducing emissions from the industrial sector in Poland is carbon pricing through the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). To reduce the potential threat of carbon leakage, many industry sectors receive free allowances, which have. Introducing Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as proposed by the European Commission, combined with a full phase-out of free allowances would accelerate decarbonisation of the sector. Using such instruments as Carbon Contracts for Difference could facilitate deployment of low carbon technologies.

1 European Environmental Agency. Trends and projections in Europe 2020 – Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets. (2020).

2 Ministerstwo Klimatu i Środowiska. Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2040 r. (2021).

3 European Commission. Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition. Investing in a climate-neutral future for the benefit of our people. (2020).

4 Forum Energii. Energy transition in Poland | 2022 Edition. (2022).

5 Eurostat. Gross inland consumption. (2021).

6 Ancygier, A. Misfit of Interests instead of the “Goodness of Fit”? Implementation of European Directives 2001/77/EC and 2009/28/EC in Poland. (Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2013).

7 NIK. Rozwój Sektora Odnawialnych Źródeł Energii. (2017).

8 European Council. Conclusions of the European Council meeting on 12 December 2019. (2019).

9 Eurostat. Population on 1st January by age, sex and type of projection. (2021).

10 European Environment Agency. EEA greenhouse gas – data viewer. (2021).

11 ACEA. Interactive map – CO2 emissions from new passenger cars in the EU, by country. ACEA. (2021).

12 ACEA. Vehicles in use in Europe 2022. (2022).

13 Ministry of Climate. Polityka energetyczna Polski do 2040 r. (2020).

14 LULUCF sinks assumed are based on the current levels provide by the EEA: -36 MtCO₂e in 2018.10

15 While global cost-effective pathways assessed by the IPCC Special Report 1.5°C provide useful guidance for an upper-limit of emissions trajectories for developed countries, they underestimate the feasible space for such countries to reach net zero earlier. The current generation of models tend to depend strongly on land-use sinks outside of currently developed countries and include fossil fuel use well beyond the time at which these could be phased out, compared to what is understood from bottom-up approaches. The scientific teams which provide these global pathways constantly improve the technologies represented in their models – and novel CDR technologies are now being included in new studies focused on deep mitigation scenarios meeting the Paris Agreement. A wide assessment database of these new scenarios is not yet available; thus, we rely on available scenarios which focus particularly on BECCS as a net-negative emission technology. Accordingly, we do not yet consider land-sector emissions (LULUCF) and other CDR approaches which developed countries will need to implement in order to counterbalance their remaining emissions and reach net zero GHG are not considered here due to data availability.

16 Calculated based on Annex to the Poland’s Energy Policy Until 2040, table 28 and historic emissions data for 1990 from the European Environment Agency.10,13

17 In some of the analysed pathways, the power sector assumes already a certain amount of carbon dioxide removal technologies, in this case bioenergy carbon capture and storage (BECCS).

Polandʼs energy mix in the industry sector

petajoule per year

SSP1 Low CDR reliance
20192030204020501 000
SSP1 High CDR reliance
20192030204020501 000
Low energy demand
20192030204020501 000
High energy demand - Low CDR reliance
20192030204020501 000
  • Natural gas
  • Coal
  • Oil and e-fuels
  • Biomass
  • Biogas
  • Biofuel
  • Electricity
  • Heat
  • Hydrogen

Polandʼs industry sector direct CO₂ emissions (of energy demand)


  • Historical emissions
  • High energy demand - Low CDR reliance
  • SSP1 Low CDR reliance
  • SSP1 High CDR reliance
  • Low energy demand

Polandʼs GHG emissions from industrial processes


  • SSP1 Low CDR reliance
  • SSP1 High CDR reliance
  • Low energy demand
  • High energy demand - Low CDR reliance
  • Historical emissions

1.5°C compatible industry sector benchmarks

Direct CO₂ emissions, direct electrification rates, and combined shares of electricity, hydrogen and biomass from illustrative 1.5°C pathways for Poland

Decarbonised industry sector by
Direct CO₂ emissions
8 to 9
1 to 2
2036 to 2038
Relative to reference year in %
−79 to −77%
−97 to −95%
−100 to −99%
Share of electricity
43 to 47
58 to 60
64 to 67
Share of electricity, hydrogren and biomass
64 to 65
76 to 85
81 to 83