The industry sector accounted for about 4% of the overall energy consumption in the DRC in 2019.²⁰ The industrial sector’s electricity share of total final energy consumption has been increasing over the past decade, reaching 56% in 2019.²⁰
1.5°C compatible pathways foresee direct CO₂ emissions from industry energy demand – already close to zero – decline to zero or turn into negative emissions by 2030 and later. This decline would be primarily driven by an increase in the share of electricity in the sector’s energy supply from 56% in 2019 up to 74% in 2030, to reach 77–93% in 2050. Electricity will help decarbonise the industry sector if it is produced from renewable energy sources which is the case in the DRC (See the power section for details).

The DRC is expecting its mining sector to grow with the increasing demand for cobalt needed for zero-emission technologies globally. The country’s economy already relies heavily on cobalt production. Cobalt mining activities will drive an increase in electricity demand, and emissions. Meeting this high electricity demand through renewables would help to decarbonise the sector and build a low-carbon value chain for the global electric vehicle fleet.²⁵

However, the DRC doesn’t address the potential risk of unsustainable development of the mining sector in its NDC. The lack of preparedness could pose a significant challenge to the decarbonisation of the DRC’s industry sector. The country would benefit from an action plan to mitigate a potential increase in the use of fossil fuels to meet the growing electricity demand and to ensure sustainable mining activities.

¹ Democratic Republic of the Congo. Contribution Déterminée à l’échelle Nationale révisée. (2021).

² African Development Bank. National Climate Change Profile: Democratic Republic of the Congo. (2018).

³ Ministère de l’Environnement et Développement Durable. Troisième Communication Nationale de la République Démocratique du Congo à la Convention Cadre sur le Changement Climatique. (2015).

⁴ African Energy Commission (AFREC). AFREC Africa Energy Balances 2019. (2019).

⁵ African Energy Commission (AFREC). Africa Energy Efficiency for the Residential Sector 2019. (2019).

⁶ United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Atlas of Africa Energy Resource. (2017).

⁷ Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC). Democratic Republic of the Congo (2019).

⁸ International Energy Agency (IEA). Data and statistics: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2018. (2022).

⁹ Radio France Internationale. RDC: l’immense enjeu et problème de l’accès à l’électricité. (2019).

¹⁰ World Bank. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2019. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2019 (2019). doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-1435-8.

¹¹ Democratic Republic of Congo. Contribution Prévue Déterminée au niveau National (CPDN). (2017).

¹² Democratic Republic of the Congo. Contribution déterminée au niveau national de la République Démocratique du Congo. (2017).

¹³ IEA. Africa Energy Outlook 2019. Preprint at (2019).

¹⁴ African Energy Commission (AFREC). AFREC Africa Energy Database. (2019).

¹⁵ Democratic Republic of Congo. Plan National Stratégique de Développement 2019-2023. (2019).

¹⁶ The World Bank. World Development Indicators database.(2019).

¹⁷ Ministère du Plan. Fiche technique sur l’énergie. (2021).

¹⁸ Kusakana, K. A Review of Energy in the Democratic Republic of Congo. in International Conference on Desalination and Renewable Energy (ICDRE) (2016).

¹⁹ Democratic Republic of Congo. Politique Nationale de l’Energie de la République Démocratique du Congo. (2022).

²⁰ International Energy Agency (IEA). Data and statistics: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2019. (2022).

²¹ CAFI. Sustainable Consumption and Partial Substitution of Wood Energy – DRCongo. CAFI web page 1–3 (2021).

²² CAFI. New Fund to develop sustainable energy in the DRC. CAFI web page 1–3 (2020).

²³ IRENA. Democratic Republic of Congo – Energy profile. (2022).

²⁴ FONAREDD. Fonds National REDD. FONAREDD web page 1–1 (2022).

²⁵ IEA. Africa Energy Outlook 2019. (2019).

²⁶ Democratic Republic of Congo. Troisième Communication Nationale. (2014).”:https://studylibfr.com/doc/4699335/troisi%C3%A8me-communication-nationale

²⁷ The World Bank. La Banque mondiale approuve 750 millions de dollars pour soutenir la gouvernance, le transport et la connectivité numérique en République démocratique du Congo. The World Bank media web 1–4 (2022).

²⁸ Democratic Republic of Congo. Plan Directeur des Transports urbains de la ville de Kinshasa. (2019).

²⁹ FAO. (2020). République démocratique du Congo.

³⁰ Deshmukh, R., Mileva, A., & Wu, G. C. (2017). Richesses Renouvelables : Comment le solaire et l‘éolien peuvent électrifier la RDC et l’Afrique du Sud.

³¹ TV5 Monde. (2022, May). RDC: Kinshasa veut multiplier sa production de pétrole | TV5MONDE – Informations.

³² The assessment was made based on Figure 2 provided in DRC‘s 2021 NDC document.

³³ See assumptions

³⁴ Global cost-effective pathways assessed by the IPCC Special Report 1.5°C tend to include fossil fuel use well beyond the time at which these could be phased out, compared to what is understood from bottom-up approaches, and often rely on rather conservative assumptions in the development of renewable energy technologies. This tends to result in greater reliance on technological CDR than if a faster transition to renewables were achieved. The scenarios available at the time of this analysis focus particularly on BECCS as a net-negative emission technology, and our downscaling methods do not yet take national BECCS potentials into account.

³⁵ Global cost-effective pathways assessed by the IPCC Special Report 1.5°C tend to include fossil fuel use well beyond the time at which these could be phased out, compared to what is understood from bottom-up approaches, and often rely on rather conservative assumptions in the development of renewable energy technologies. This tends to result in greater reliance on technological CDR than if a faster transition to renewables were achieved. The scenarios available at the time of this analysis focus particularly on BECCS as a net-negative emission technology, and our downscaling methods do not yet take national BECCS potentials into account. To note that the emissions range by 2050 is very broad due to high uncertainties in the assessed models.