Power sector in 2030
China generates a little over a quarter of the world’s electricity. As of 2019, the country’s power mix is 65% reliant on coal. 1.5°C compatible pathways indicate that China would need to phase out coal between 2030 and 2040, and increase the share of renewables in power generation to around 90% by 2030. Gas, which in 2019 accounted for around 3% of the power mix, would need to be phased out this decade.
Year-on-year growth of wind and solar capacity for power generation has remained high, particularly compared with fossil fuel-based capacity. In 2020, China installed 73 GW of wind and 49 GW of solar capacity.
China’s NDC sets a target of 1200 GW of installed wind and solar by 2030, and this target is restated in its 14th Five-year Plan for Renewable Energy. Although this is welcome, it is nonetheless an unambitious target given current policy projections and recent wind and solar capacity growth rates.
Towards a fully decarbonised power sector
For 1.5°C compatibility, China’s power sector would need to reach zero CO₂ emissions no later than 2039 and contribute to negative emissions thereafter. Carbon intensity would need to reach 0-60 gCO₂/kWh by 2030, a reduction of 89%-99% below 2019 levels.
Decarbonisation of the power sector could primarily be driven by the phase-out of coal and by transitioning to renewables. Some scenarios analysed show that carbon capture and storage (CCS) may also play a minor role in a 1.5°C compatible pathway. However, given that CCS is not currently commercially viable, and that none of the three large scale projects under development is expected to come online before mid-century, this technology should not be seen as a substitute for the phase-out of coal and gas.3
The 1.5°C scenarios analysed show renewables dominating China’s future power generation mix, contributing 90% by 2030. Wind and solar capacities have grown significantly faster than hydropower capacity in recent years, and are poised to overtake hydropower in the near future.
However, in terms of current generation, hydropower far surpasses wind and solar, the three generating respectively 1273 TWh (17% of total), 406 TWh (5%), and 224 TWh (3%) in 2019.26 The Chinese government aims to increase the country’s hydro capacity, alongside wind and solar.27,28 However, continuing development of hydropower, particularly of the large-scale variety, poses significant environmental and social risks.29-34
1 The People’s Republic of China. China’s Achievements, New Goals and New Measures for Nationally Determined Contributions. 2021.
2 Climate Action Tracker. China. November 2022 update. Climate Action Tracker. 2022.
3 Yvonne Deng, Ursula Fuentes, Hare, B., Welder, L. & Gidden, M. U.S. and China Climate Goals : Scenarios for 2030 and Mid-Century. 2020.
4 Climate Action Tracker. China. May 2022 update. Climate Action Tracker. 2022.
5 Liu, Q. et al. Pathway and policy analysis to China’s deep decarbonization. Chinese J. Popul. Resour. Environ. 15, 39–49 (2017).
6 Zheng, X. et al. Drivers of change in China’s energy-related CO2 emissions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 117, 29–36 (2020).
7 IEA. Key World Energy Statistics. 2021.
8 Bahr, A. China’s coal capacity surge need not be at odds with ambitious climate action. China Dialogue. 2020.
9 Myllyvirta, L., Zhang, S. & Shen, X. Analysis: Will China build hundreds of new coal plants in the 2020s? Carbon Brief. 2020).
10 Global Energy Monitor et al. Boom and Bust Coal 2022. 2022.
11 Climate Action Tracker. New momentum reduces emissions gap, but huge gap remains – analysis. Climate Action Tracker. 2021.
12 Reuters. China to cut coal use share below 56% in 2021. Reuters. 2021.
13 Wang, C. N. Brief: Coal phase-out in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): an analysis of Chinese-backed coal power from 2014-2020. 2021.
14 Wang, C. N. China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment report 2021. Green BRI Center, International Institute of Green Finance (IIGF). 2022.
15 Kusmer, A. China launches world’s largest carbon market. PRI. 2021.
16 Farand, C. China launches world’s largest carbon market for power sector. Climate Home News. 2021.
17 Jinping, X. Full Text: Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Leaders Summit on Climate. Xinhuanet. 2021.
18 Xinhua. China unveils plan for new energy vehicle industry. Xinhuanet. 2021.
19 Lutsey, N., Cui, H. & Yu, R. Evaluating Electric Vehicle Costs and Benefits in China in the 2020 – 2035 Time Frame. 2021.
20 Liu, H., Liu, J. & You, X. Q&A: What does China’s 14th ‘five year plan’ mean for climate change? Carbon Brief. 2021.
21 Xu, M. & Singh, S. China cuts ‘carbon intensity’ 18.8% in past five years, in effort to rein in emissions. Reuters. 2021.
22 IEA. Coal Information: Overview. 2020.
23 World Resources Institute. Accelerating the Net-Zero Transition: Strategic Action for China’s 14th Five-Year Plan. 2020. doi:https://doi.org/10.46830/wrirpt.20.00018.
24 IEA. Renewables 2021 Analysis and forecasts to 2026. 2021.
25 The People’s Republic of China. China’s Mid-Century Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy. 2021.
26 IEA. World Energy Outlook 2021. 2021.
27 Murphy, B. Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035 (English translation). 2021.
28 Yu, Y. Renewable Energy in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan: Five Changes. Energy Iceberg. 2021.
29 Hu, Y. & Cheng, H. The urgency of assessing the greenhouse gas budgets of hydroelectric reservoirs in China. Nat. Clim. Chang. 3, 708–712. 2013.
30 Li, S., Zhang, Q., Bush, R. T. & Sullivan, L. A. Methane and CO2 emissions from China’s hydroelectric reservoirs: a new quantitative synthesis. Environ. Sci. Pollut. Res. 22, 5325–5339. 2015.
31 Xie, X., Jiang, X., Zhang, T. & Huang, Z. Regional water footprints assessment for hydroelectricity generation in China. Renew. Energy 138, 316–325. 2019.
32 Yuefang, D. & Steil, S. China Three Gorges Project resettlement: Policy, planning and implementation. J. Refug. Stud. 16, 422–434. 2003.
33 Lewis, C. China’s Great Dam Boom: A Major Assult on Its Rivers. Yale Environment 360. 2013.
34 Yu, Y. China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for Power Industries (2): No Plans for Wind, Solar & Hydro? Energy Iceberg. 2020.
35 IEA. An Energy Sector Roadmap to Carbon Neutrality in China. 2021.
36 Sandalow, D. Guide to Chinese Climate Policy 2019. 2019.
37 Koty, A. C. What is the China Standards 2035 Plan and How Will it Impact Emerging Industries? China Briefing. 2020.
38 China Dialogue. National carbon market expansion may be delayed to 2023. China Dialogue. 2022.
39 The assessment of GDP carbon intensity follows from that conducted in previous analysis but here we have updated data on historical carbon emissions (using the PRIMAP 2021 database), GDP (using Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2021), and GDP growth projections (from World Bank). The GDP growth rate from 2025-2030 is assumed to be 5% p.a.
40 If only covering CO₂, the target would lead to around 2050 MtCO₂e p.a. in 2060 (excluding LULUCF) or emissions reductions of around 75% below 2005 levels. If the target were to cover all GHG emissions, 2060 emissions would be around 600 MtCO₂e p.a. (excluding LULUCF), or around 92% below 2005 levels.3 The 0.1°C of additional warming by 2100 would be a result of the difference in cumulative emissions between an emissions pathway which follow a carbon neutrality target (leading to greater cumulative emissions) versus a GHG neutrality target (leading to less cumulative emissions).
41 Includes electricity and hydrogen. For it to be zero emissions, it would need to be produced out of renewable energies only.
Chinaʼs power mix
terawatt-hour per year
- Negative emissions technologies via BECCS
- Unabated fossil
- Nuclear and/or fossil with CCS
- Renewables incl. biomass
Chinaʼs power sector emissions and carbon intensity
MtCO₂/yr
- Historical emissions
- SSP1 High CDR reliance
- SSP1 Low CDR reliance
- High energy demand - Low CDR reliance
- Low energy demand
- 100%RE
1.5°C compatible power sector benchmarks
Carbon intensity, renewable generation share, and fossil fuel generation share from illustrative 1.5°C pathways for China
Indicator | 2019 | 2030 | 2040 | 2050 | Decarbonised power sector by |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Carbon intensity of power gCO₂/kWh | 560 | 0 to 60 | 0 | −50 to 0 | 2030 to 2039 |
Relative to reference year in % | −99 to −89% | −100% | −109 to −100% |
Indicator | 2019 | 2030 | 2040 | 2050 | Year of phase-out |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Share of unabated coal Percent | 65 | 0 to 7 | 0 | 0 | 2030 |
Share of unabated gas Percent | 3 | 0 to 1 | 0 | 0 | 2025 to 2031 |
Share of renewable energy Percent | 27 | 90 to 91 | 93 to 97 | 94 to 100 | |
Share of unabated fossil fuel Percent | 68 | 1 to 8 | 0 | 0 |
Investments
Demand shifting towards the power sector
The 1.5°C compatible pathways analysed here tend to show a strong increase in power generation and installed capacities across time compared with a current policy scenario. This is because end-use sectors (such as transport, buildings or industry) are increasingly electrified under 1.5°C compatible pathways, shifting energy demand to the power sector. Globally, the “high energy demand” pathway entails a high degree of renewable energy-based electrification across the various sectors, and thus sees a considerable increase in renewable energy capacities over time. See the power section for capacities deployment under the various models.
Chinaʼs renewable electricity investments
Billion USD / yr
Yearly investment requirements in renewable energy
Across the set of 1.5°C pathways that we have analysed, annual investments in renewable energy excluding BECCS increase in China to be on the order of USD 85 to 413 billion by 2030 and USD 94 to 593 billion by 2040 depending on the scenario considered. The ‘high energy demand, low CDR reliance’ pathway shows a particularly high increase in renewable capacity investments, which could be driven by an increase of electrification of end-use sectors, growing energy demand, and expansion of electricity access. Other modelled pathways have relatively lower investments in renewables and rely to varying degrees on other technologies and measures such as energy efficiency and negative emissions technologies, of which the latter can require high up-front investments.